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Radicalism and the strengthening of the radical right 
parties have become dominant phenomena of recent 
political transformations. As a result, the topic of the 
transitions of radical right-wing parties has become 
a dynamically growing segment of political geogra-
phy and political science literature. This book is an 
important theoretical contribution to the core issue 
along with the inclusion-moderation thesis, which 
holds that participation in democratic institutions 
and procedures will amend the radical nature and 
ideology of political parties. Authors of the volume 
analyse the ‘mainstreaming’ of various radical 
right-wing parties in several countries and different 
political situations in Western Europe, which is also 
a rather current process in Hungary if we consider 
the transition of the party Jobbik. 
The authors provide us a description about the 
behaviour of radical right parties according to their 
goals and positions. In the 1990s, growing intolerance 
against immigrants and increasing populism gave the 
opportunity for many radical right-wing parties to 
escape from the margins. The French National Front 
(Front National, FN), the Austrian Freedom Party 
(Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), the Norwegian 
Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, Frp) and the Swiss 
People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP) be-
came supported by more than 10 per cent of the elec-
torate as a result of increasing disappointments of 
voters. After the turn of the millennium the Danish 
People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) and the Flemish 
Interest (Vlaams Blok/Belang, VB) also crossed the 10 
per cent threshold and many other radical-right wing 
parties emerged on the scene so the upward trend 
continued for the radical right-wing party family. The 
average vote share of radical-right wing parties in 
national elections increased from 8.0 per cent in the 
1990s to 12.5 per cent by nowadays.
Some of these radical right parties even entered 
governments, either as cabinet members or as support 
parties of minority governments. Every radical right-
wing party had to face the dilemma between vote 
maximising and office-seeking. Participating in a mi-
nority government always comes with price and these 
parties had to give up their radical profile, but on 
the other hand, they could more likely achieve their 
political goals. In Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Norway, 
Finland and the Netherlands radical right-wing par-
ties took up the responsibilities that come with hold-
ing office, while the Danish People’s Party and the 
Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) agreed 
to support minority governments without formally 
joining them. In total these radical right-wing par-
ties participated in multiple coalitions, leading to the 
formation of 17 governments between 1990 and 2015. 
The main aim of this volume is to assess whether the 
described developments have induced radical right-
wing parties to move into the mainstream.
The book consists of two major parts and contains 
altogether thirteen chapters. The first part of the 
book sets the conceptual framework in general and 
presents the explanatory model for mainstreaming. 
Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange and Matthijs 
Rooduijn address in a general and comparative way 
the question whether and in what ways radical right-
wing parties have moved into the mainstream by use 
of expert surveys, comparative manifesto data analy-
ses and their own measurements. They assess how 
radical right-wing parties mellowed programmatic 
positions, broadened their scope of issues and toned 
down populist stances, or how mainstream right-
wing parties became more radical. 
The term ‘mainstream’ is widely used in po-
litical science, but definitions are generally lacking. 
According to the authors the term has at least two dif-
ferent meanings. On the one hand, it refers most often 
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to centre-left and centre-right parties like Christian 
democratic, conservative, liberal and social demo-
cratic parties. So it denotes parties that have a centrist 
position on the classic left-right scale and attribute 
importance to socio-economic issues. In this sense, 
the term ‘mainstream parties’ is often used in con-
trast to ‘radical parties’ and ‘niche parties’ (including 
radical right-wing populist parties, green parties, left-
libertarian parties and regionalist parties that exploit 
programmatic niches). On the other hand, the term 
‘mainstream parties’ is used to describe established 
parties that are loyal to the political system and op-
pose anti-establishment and anti-political move-
ments, which seek reforms to overthrow the existing 
political system, and the norms and values on which 
it is based. In this meaning the term ‘mainstream’ can 
encompass programmatic and positional centrism, 
the high salience of socio-economic issues, and be-
haviour and stances that show commitment to the 
principles of liberal democracy and to the formal and 
informal rules of the political game.
Radical right-wing parties potentially face high 
costs when they join the mainstream so it is a big 
question how to combine a populist stance with of-
fice after entering government. Many of their vot-
ers become disillusioned once they are in office. 
Government participation can have a moderating 
effect on radical right-wing parties’ stance because it 
is difficult to maintain an anti-establishment profile, 
as governing parties are in many way part of the es-
tablishment. In a minority government there might be 
more opportunities to maintain an anti-establishment 
profile than for radical right-wing parties that are 
member of a majority government. Mainstreaming 
can be a short-lived phenomenon, however, when it is 
only the coalition forcing them into the mainstream. 
When the government participation terminates, very 
often these parties return to opposition, and radical-
ise again. Thus, the phenomenon of mainstreaming 
is often not the result of internal change and may, 
therefore, be ephemeral. On the other hand, a radical 
(niche party) profile, and anti-establishment attitudes 
tend to be barriers to entering office but they can be 
rewarding electorally. Therefore, a vote-seeking strat-
egy may be a disincentive for radical right-wing par-
ties to move into the mainstream.
In the second chapter authors operationalise the 
three dimensions of mainstreaming and describe 
the data that they used to measure them. In addi-
tion, they analyse changes in party scores in order 
to discern general patterns of mainstreaming. They 
study whether the programmatic profiles of radical 
right-wing parties have changed over time, and if so, 
whether these changes signal that these parties have 
become more like mainstream parties. Akkerman, 
Lange and Rooduijn measured radicalness, anti-es-
tablishment character and ‘nichness’ of radical right 
parties. The most commonly used methods for the 
estimation of party positions and their salience are 
the analysis of election manifestos (manifesto based 
approach) or the analysis of actors’ (e.g. party mem-
bers, voters, experts) perceptions of parties’ positions 
and their salience. While manifesto-based approaches 
give us more reliable estimates because they rely on 
an extensive, predetermined coding scheme, percep-
tion-based approaches produce more valid estimates 
because they tap more easily into a general notion of 
left and right, and other party attitudes. 
Overall there is no indication that radical right-
wing parties tend to become less radical. Only the 
Danish DF has been in office continuously since the 
turn of the millennium and it is the party that has 
become most clearly mainstreamed. But it is the only 
example that fully confirms a correlation between ex-
perience in a coalition government and mainstream-
ing. In contrast, the Swiss SVP has also been continu-
ously in office, but this party has become more radi-
cal over time. Nevertheless, the Swiss case can be an 
exception because the seven members of the Swiss 
government are elected by the federal parliament and 
there is no real president or prime minister, and the 
coalition has never been based on a common legisla-
ture programme, so parties enjoy a considerable level 
of autonomy with respect to their representatives in 
government.
As the authors measured, from the early 2000s rad-
ical right-wing parties have on average begun to pay 
more attention to socio-economic issues, which could 
be taken as a sign of mainstreaming. However, main-
stream parties also experienced a period around the 
millennium when they more emphasised these issues 
than before, which makes the changes in the agenda 
of radical right-wing parties less distinct. Moreover, 
radical right-wing parties have started to pay more 
attention to sociocultural issues in this period, which 
means that they reinforced their niche party profile. 
Authors could clearly distinguish the radicalisation 
of the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) 
and the Belgian VB, and the mainstreaming of the 
Austrian Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis 
Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ) and the Dutch PVV. This 
means that the first two parties gradually devoted 
more attention to sociocultural issues and less to so-
cio-economic ones, while the latter two moved into 
the opposite direction. The comparative analysis also 
suggests that mainstreaming could indeed be related 
to the question of participation in government and, 
therefore, to shifts from vote- to office-seeking. For 
example, the mainstreaming of the DF, FPÖ and PVV 
occurred prior to the elections in which these par-
ties assumed office or in which they started to sup-
port a minority government. Inversely, the Belgian 
VB radicalised after a period of exclusion through 
the cordon sanitaire. At the same time many radical 
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right-wing parties began to re-radicalise during or 
after their government participation. All in all, these 
observations indicate that being in office may have a 
temporary mainstreaming effect.
In the third chapter Matthijs Rooduijn investigates 
whether voters for radical right-wing parties and 
mainstream parties have become increasingly alike 
over time. Many researchers argue that those who 
vote for radical right-wing parties tend to have lower 
socio-economic status and they can be considered as 
the ‘losers of modernity’ because they have to com-
pete with immigrants for low-skilled jobs. Rooduijn 
displays a mechanism which can also be observed in 
Hungarian political contexts. He claims that when 
mainstream parties are radicalising their message 
and use populist discourses they intend to convince 
voters who previously supported radical right-wing 
parties. On the other hand, radicalisation could 
also result that the more moderate voters leave the 
party. To assess the attitudes and sociodemographic 
characteristics of voters for the radical right-wing 
Rooduijn applied the European Social Survey (ESS). 
For every variable of interest, he pointed out how 
regression coefficients have changed over time. He 
expected that radical right-wing voters do not dif-
fer significantly from mainstream voters. In general, 
from a socio-economic point of view, radical right-
wing voters have not become increasingly similar to 
mainstream voters because they tend to have lower 
educational levels, and they belong to lower socio-
economic classes which status has not changed in the 
last decade. But when attitudes towards the European 
integration were measured, the author observed that 
radical right-wing voters were significantly differ-
ent from mainstream voters in 2004, 2006 and 2008, 
but not in 2012. It means that the gap between the 
two groups decreased considerably and according to 
his analysis this convergence is mainly the result of 
the radicalisation of the mainstream voters and not 
the ‘mainstreaming’ of the radical right-wing vot-
ers. Overall, since the beginning of the millennium 
there has been a distinct but decreasing gap between 
voters of the mainstream parties and voters of the 
radical right-wing parties, which is mainly due to the 
radicalisation of mainstream voters, for radical voters 
have not mainstreamed at all. 
The second section of the book is the largest with 
nine case studies about Western European coun-
tries. They focus on electorally successful radical 
right-wing parties with stable party organisations. 
Authors of this section selected only those parties 
that have already gained an electoral breakthrough 
and for whom national office is at least in the longer 
term a realistic option. Most parties, except for the 
Flemish Interest, the French National Front and 
the UK Independence Party (UKIP), also had the 
opportunity to enter national office. Many of them 
renewed their ideological profile just like the Swiss 
SVP and the Austrian FPÖ. The Finnish Finns Party 
(Perussuomalaiset, PS) did not have to start from 
scratch, partly because it was formed as a successor 
party of an agrarian populist party in 1995. The others 
are new parties that emerged in the 1970s or later, but 
not all of them started as radical right-wing parties. 
These parties managed electoral breakthroughs at 
one point or another, and gathered sufficient elec-
toral support and attention through media coverage 
to be able to put pressure on the policy agendas of 
the political competitors. They can also be character-
ised by a blackmail potential in the sense that they 
have been able to politicise issues like immigration, 
European integration or law and order issues, which 
forced other parties to amend their policy agendas.
Majority system is a hard challenge for FN and 
UKIP to gain access to parliament and these parties 
have great difficulties also in gaining coalition poten-
tial, as some of them, like the Belgian VB and the FN, 
have been subjected to a cordon sanitaire by other 
parties. This political isolation and stigmatisation by 
the mainstream parties resulted in the prioritisation 
of vote-maximisation because it is the most realistic 
option for radical right-wing parties. Yet, most of the 
other radical right-wing parties dealt with in the book 
(e.g. FrP, PS, PVV, SVP, FPÖ) have managed to gain 
coalition potential at a certain point. The Danish DF 
and the Swiss SVP participated more than once in 
national office, the others have only a one-time ex-
perience which noted that coalition potential can be 
gained but also can be lost again. The former two 
parties have got the longest history of (semi-)inclu-
sion into national office and continuous blackmail 
and coalition potential, while FrP, PS, FPÖ, PVV have 
got incidental or recent (semi-)inclusion into national 
office with substantial blackmail potential.
Nowadays, FN, which is commonly considered a 
model for the Western European radical right, is at 
a political crossroads ahead of the 2017 presidential 
elections. (Manuscript was submitted on March 30th, 
2017, before the French presidential elections took place. 
– The editor.) The filtered political rhetoric and de-de-
monisation has allowed the party to broaden its elec-
toral support and tap into new social groups such as 
women or younger voters. Presidential polls promise 
Marine Le Pen new electoral heights in the 2017 elec-
tions and public opinion polls suggest that the FN’s 
negative views of immigration, Islam or the EU are 
currently shared by a large proportion of the French. 
According to Gilles Ivaldi changes of the electoral 
market include a growing attitudinal convergence 
between the conservative and the radical right poles 
of the French electorate, which augments the poten-
tial for future coalitions. Although the FN seems to be 
gradually normalising in French politics, nonetheless 
a majority of the French still regard it as an extremist 
party with little governmental credibility. 
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This kind of incredibility towards the radical right-
wing appeared in Dutch elections held earlier this 
year. Led by Geert Wilders, PVV has been the focus of 
international attention ahead of the general elections 
in the Netherlands because events there bear some 
similarities to what happened in recent US and British 
elections. But it has not happened in the same way. 
Although Prime Minister Mark Rutte (People’s Party 
for Freedom and Democracy, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid 
en Democratie, VVD) lost 8 from 41 seats and Geert 
Wilders gained 5 to 15 seats, the resounding success 
of radical right failed this time. The map of election 
results shows that the base areas of PVV are near to 
the German border, mainly in the southern Limburg 
province and in the northern Drenthe.
To sum up, contributions to this volume revealed 
that Western European radical right-wing parties 
have been mainstreaming to relatively small extent 
on the dimension of radicalness, but there has been 
partial or substantial mainstreaming in the other di-
mensions such as niche profile, anti-establishment 
ideology and extreme right reputation. These par-
ties have overall remained radical in their positions 
on issues related to their nationalist ideology (im-
migration, authoritarianism, European integration). 
The inclusion-moderation thesis is partially inade-
quate in the case of radical right-wing parties because 
electoral competition generally has not pressured 
these parties to moderate. Exceptions to these find-
ings are UKIP and FN, where plurality or majority 
systems had a moderating effect. The case studies 
showed that mainstreaming can be a successful strat-
egy if the choice for office-seeking is internally sup-
ported by the party elite and activists. On the other 
hand, a radical profile, a niche party profile, and anti-
establishment attitude tend to be barrier to entering 
office but they can be rewarding in votes. Therefore, a 
vote-seeking strategy may be a disincentive for radi-
cal right-wing parties to move into the mainstream 
and lose the voters as a result of the moderate turn. 
They have to choose between the short-term vote-
seeker and the long-term office-seeker strategies. 
These questions are also relevant for the Hungarian 
Jobbik (and other parties in East Central Europe with 
similar radical right-wing platforms), which seems to 
have chosen the long-term office-seeking strategy, but 
the effects of this mainstreaming will come to light 
only in the 2018 elections.
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